There is considerable evidence that the majority of children with autism have impairments in the development of a theory of mind (see Baron-Cohen, 1993 , 1995 . Such a deficit may underhe the social, communicative, and imaginative abnormalities that are diagnostic of the condition, since a theory of mind is necessary for normal development in each of these three areas. The theory of mind deficit appears to be expressed very early, from at least the end ofthe first year of life, as joint attention deficits (Baron-Cohen, 1989a; BaronCohen, Allen, & Gillberg, 1992; Baron-Cohen, Cox, et al., 1996; Sigman, Mundy, Ungerer, & Sherman, 1986) .
However, there is some evidence that appears to contradict the notion that a theory of mind deficit is a core cognitive deficit in autism. First, Bowler (1992) found that adults with Asperger Syndrome-who share the social and communicative symptoms of autism but who have no history of language delay-pass secondorder theory of mind tests. Second-order theory of mind tests involve the subject reasoning about what one person thinks about another person's thoughts. Ozonoff and her colleagues (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991 ) also found some adults with "high-functioning autism" or Asperger
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Syndrome who passed second-order theory of mind tests. Both studies contradict the earlier finding from BaronCohen (1989b) that there is an impairment in theory of mind ability in autism. In the latter study, no subjects with autism passed the second-order test of theory of mind.
However, these studies cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for an intact theory of mind in such individuals with autism or Asperger Syndrome, because such secondorder tests can easily produce ceiling effects if used with subjects with a mental age above 6 years. This is because children with normal intelligence pass secondorder theory of mind tasks at about 6 years (Perner & Wimmer, 1985) . It is unfortunate that many workers in this field have thought of second-order tests as " complex " or high-level tests of theory of mind. Certainly, they are more complex than first-order tests (in which the subject simply has to infer the thoughts of another person) (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983 )-but recall that normal 4-year-old children pass first-order tests.
In short, neither first-or second-order tests are complex tests of theory of mind. They are simply probes for 4-or 6-year-old level skills, respectively, in this domain. Perhaps if they had been labelled as such, no-one would ever have thought of them as suitable tests of whether an adult (with autism, Asperger Syndrome, or any other condition) has a fully functional theory of mind. Finding a 30-year-old individual with autism, of normal intel-814 S. BARON-COHEN et al. ligence, who can pass a theory of mind test at the level of a normal 6-year-old does not lead to the conclusion that they are necessarily normal in this domain. All we can conclude is that they have intact theory of mind skills at the level of a 6-year-old. Happe's (1994a) study is the only one to take this issue seriously. She tested adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome on an "advanced" theory of mind task. This involved story comprehension, where the key questions in the task either concerned a character's mental states (the experimental condition) or physical events (the control condition). Happe's task was pitched at the level of a normal 8-9-year-old, and in this respect, it is certainly more advanced than previous tests of theory of mind. She found that adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome had more difficulty with the mental state stories than did matched controls, and that they used fewer appropriate mental state terms in their justifications of why characters behaved as they did.
In the present study we used a new, adult test of theory of mind competence, as another advanced test with which to test high-functioning adults with autism or AS. This extends Happe's line of research. The task involves looking at photographs ofthe eye region ofthe faces, and making a forced choice between which of two words best describes what the person (in the photograph) might be thinking or feeling. The task is called the " Reading the Mind in the Eyes" Task, or the Eyes Task for short.
The Eyes Task involved theory of mind skills in the sense that subject has to understand mental state terms and match them to faces (or parts of faces, in this case). The choice is always between two mental state terms, some of which are " basic", in Ekman's (1992) sense (such as happy, sad, angry, or afraid), and others of which are more "complex" (such as reflective, arrogant, scheming, planning, etc.). The forced-choice method for interpreting faces in terms of mental states has been used successfully before (Baron-Cohen, Riviere, et al., 1996) . The task could equally be called a test of "mindreading" in that nothing in the test addresses whether the subject is using a "theory" or not. Here, as elsewhere, we use the terms "theory of mind" and "mindreading" interchangeably. An earlier study using this task found that parents of children with Asperger Syndrome perform significantly worse than matched controls, whilst performing significantly better on the Embedded Figures Task (BaronCohen & Hammer, in press a).
In the study reported below, three groups of subjects were compared on the Eyes Task: adults with autism or Asperger Syndrome, normal adults, and a clinical control group, adults with Tourette Syndrome. The latter was chosen because of the following similarities between autism, Asperger Syndrome, and Tourette Syndrome:
(1) they all had intelligence in the normal range; (2) they had all suffered from a developmental disorder since childhood; (3) these disorders all cause disruptions to both normal schooling and normal peer relations; (4) these disorders are also all postulated to involve frontal abnormalities (Baron-Cohen, Cross, et al., 1994; BaronCohen, Robertson, & Moriarty, 1994; Bishop, 1992) ; (5) all have a sizeable genetic aetiology (Bolton & Rutter, 1990; Robertson, 1994) ; and (6) these disorders also all affect males more than females.
Naturally, there are many differences between autism and Asperger Syndrome on the one hand, and Tourette Syndrome on the other (e.g. different frontal abnormalities are implicated in these disorders), but the similarities they share serve to control for the presence of an organic, childhood-onset psychiatric disorder. We predicted that despite their psychiatric history, patients with Tourette Syndrome would be unimpaired on this advanced theory of mind test, whereas the subjects with autism or Asperger Syndrome would show a significant impairment.
We make the assumption that the Eyes Task is a theory of mind task because of the mental state attribution component. However, this assumption warrants direct testing. This was possible because subjects in the present study using the Eyes Task also took part in a separate study using Happe's (1994a) Strange Stories Task (Jolliffe, 1997). We predicted that if both the Eyes Task and the Strange Stories Task were indices of a relatively advanced theory of mind, then if subjects had difficulties with one of these tasks, they should also have difficulties with the other.
The Eyes Task also involves some other process, namely basic aspects of emotion recognition and face perception. In order to test if difficulties on the Eyes Task were specific to the mental state attribution component or were due to these other processes, we included two control tasks: a basic emotion recognition task (adapted from Ekman, 1992) , and a gender recognition task.
Finally, if the Eyes Task was vahdated as an adult test of theory of mind, this afforded us the opportunity to test for a subtle sex difference in the normal group. Our folk psychology would lead us to expect that normal females may be superior to normal males in the domain of social sensitivity or empathy, but most previous theory of mind research has not used sufficiently subtle tests to evaluate if there is any basis to this (an exception is a study by Hall, 1977) . We therefore analysed larger numbers of normal male and female subjects separately, to examine this possibility.
The Experiment Subjects
Three groups of subjects were tested. Group I. This comprised 16 subjects with high-functioning autism (HFA, T V = 4) or Asperger Syndrome (AS, N= 12). The sex ratio was 13:3 (miO-The HFA Group all showed a history of "classical" autism (i.e. autism accompanied by language delay) and fulfilled established diagnostic criteria (American Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV, 1994) . Note that because they were high-functioning adults, they would be considered " residual" cases. The AS Group all met the same criteria for autism, but without any clinically significant language delay (i.e. they had single words by age 2, or phrase speech by age 3, as reported by their parent). They thus met criteria for Asperger Syndrome as defined in ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1994) . They were all of normal intelligence. As such, they are relatively rare. They can be considered as cases of "pure" autism or Asperger Syndrome, unconfounded by mental handicap.
Group 2. This comprised 50 normal age-matched adults (25 male and 25 female) drawn from the general population of Cambridge (excluding members of the University), all of whom had no history of any psychiatric condition (as established by self-report). They were selected randomly from the subject panel held in the University Department. IQ information was not collected on subjects in this group, but they were all assumed to have intelligence in the normal range.
Group 3. This comprised 10 adult patients with Tourette Syndrome (TS), also age-matched with Groups 1 and 2. The sex ratio was 8:2 (m:f), thus mirroring the ratio in Group 1. They were attending a tertiary referral centre in London, and had all been diagnosed by a leading expert in the field of Tourette Syndrome (Dr Mary Robertson), on the basis of meeting DSM-IV criteria for Tourette Syndrome.
The subjects with autism or Asperger Syndrome were selected for being of at least normal intelligence (i.e. scoring > 85) on the Wechsler Adult Intelhgence Test Revised Edition (WAIS-R) (Wechsler, 1981 : full scale, performance, and verbal IQ). The WAIS-R was used because of previous work showing discrepancies between performance and verbal IQ in these groups (Frith, 1989; Happe, 1994b) . We therefore ensured that these subjects had an IQ > 85 on both verbal and performance scales.
The subjects with Tourette Syndrome were also selected for being in the normal IQ range, prorated from four subtests ofthe WAIS-R (Block Design, Object Assembly, Vocabulary, and Comprehension). This short version of the WAIS-R was administered to the subjects with Tourette Syndrome because of its brevity, since these subjects were only available for limited testing in this study. It correlates (.91) with full-scale WAIS-R IQ (Crawford et al., 1992) .
Finally, subjects in the two clinical groups were selected for being able to pass two first-order false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989) , and a second-order false belief task (Baron-Cohen, 1989b ). This was so that if any deficits were found on the Eyes Task, they could be attributed to mindreading problems beyond a 6-year-old level. In fact, this did not lead to any of the clinical subjects being excluded. Table 1 gives the subject characteristics in terms of chronological age (CA), and WAIS-R IQ. ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between the three groups on age {p > .05), or between the clinical groups in terms of WAIS-R.
Method and Design
The Eyes Task, the Strange Stories Task, and the two control tasks were presented in random order, to all subjects. The subjects were tested individually in a quiet room either in their own home, in our clinic, or in our lab at the University.
The Eyes Task
Items from the Eyes Task were first described by BaronCohen (1995) as an adult test of the "language of the eyes". This extends an earlier idea of Numenmaa's (1964) that there might be a "language ofthe face" for expressing mental states. The test comprises photographs ofthe eye region of 25 different faces (males and female). The faces were taken from magazine photos. All faces were standardised to one size (15x10 cms), and all were black and white, with the same region of the face selected for each photo-from midway along the nose to just above the eyebrow. Figure 1 shows a selection of the photo- graphs used (also the relevant mental state terms for each photo). Each picture was shown for 3 seconds, with a forced choice between two mental state terms printed under each picture. The Experimenter says to the subject" Which word best describes what this person is feeling or thinking?" The maximum score on this test is 25.
Construction of the Eyes Task
The target word to describe the mental state behind each pair of eyes was generated by four judges (two male and two female) in open discussion. A foil word was selected that was the semantic opposite of the target word, in all cases. These were then tested on a panel of eight judges (four male and four female) who were all independent raters, blind to the hypotheses of the study. On the target words there was unanimous agreement by all eight independent raters. The full set of mental state terms (and their foils) is shown in Table 2 . Notice that the mental state terms include both basic and complex mental states.
Validity of the Eyes Task
The Eyes Task is designed to be a "pure" theory of mind test, at an advanced level. This is because, as far as we can see, the test itself involves no executive function component (no attention switching, inhibition, planning, etc., cf Ozonoff et al., 1991; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991) and no central coherence component (since there is little contextual information available, cf Frith, 1989) . This is not to say that such processes may not play a role in the development of a theory of mind-only that the task itself has no planning or context component. As mentioned earlier, in order to validate the Eyes Task as a theory of mind task, subjects in the two clinical groups were also tested on Happe's (1994a) Strange Stories. In the case of the subjects with autism and Asperger Syndrome, this was part ofa separate study (Jolliffe, 1997) . If the Eyes Task was indeed tapping theory of mind, then performance on the Eyes Task should correlate with performance on Happe's strange stories.
Control Tasks
Finally, in order to check whether deficits on the Eyes Task were due to other factors, we administered two control tasks to the subjects in Group 1.
Gender Recognition Task. This involved looking at the same sets of eyes in the experimental task, but this time identifying the gender of person in each photograph. This is a social judgement without involving mind reading, and allowed us to check if any deficits on the Eyes Task could be attributed to general deficits in face perception, perceptual discrimination, or social perception. This naturally had a maximum score of 25.
Basic Emotion Recognition Task {Emotion Task). This involved judging photographs of whole faces displaying the basic emotions (based on the Ekman categories). This was to check whether any deficits on the Eyes Task could be attributed to a deficit in basic emotion expression recognition. Six faces were used, testing the following basic emotions: happy, sad, angry, afraid, disgusted, and surprised. Examples of the faces used are shown in Fig. 2 . Note that the Basic Emotion Recognition Task differs from the Eyes Task in two ways:
(1) the Emotion Task affords information from the whole face, whereas the Eyes Task has information from the eyes alone.
(2) The Emotion Task tests just the basic (six) emotions, whereas the Eyes Task tests the full range of mental states.
Results
The results on the Eyes Task from the between-groups analyses are shown in Table 3 , and the results from the between-sex analysis in the normal group are shown in Table 4 . To test a priori predictions on the Eyes Task, independent /-tests were used, with a significance level of p < .01 set to correct for carrying out multiple comparisons. The subjects with Tourette Syndrome did not differ from normal subjects (combined male and female) on this task (/ = 0.092, 58^, p > .93), but both control groups performed significantly better than the group with autism or Asperger Syndrome (Autism/AS x Normal, t= -5.16,64cf/;/) = .0001; Autism/AS xTS,f= -3.98, 24dfp = .001). In the normal group, as predicted, female subjects performed significantly better than male subjects (/ = -4.8, 4Sdf p = .0001). The Autism/AS group difference remained significant even when that group was compared more conservatively to the normal male group {t = 2.93., 39dfp = .006). Inspection suggested there was no difference between subjects with autism and Asperger Syndrome, though because of sample sizes this was not tested statistically. It is of interest to look at individual performance. If one takes a cut-off of > 15/25 on the Eyes Test as being above chance (Binomial Test), then only 8/16 of the Autism/AS group were above chance, versus 10/10 of the TS group, and 50/50 of the Normal group. This is a highly significant difference (chi-square, p < .01).
On the Gender and Emotion Control Tasks, there were no differences between the groups [Gender: F (3, 69) = 0.3,p > .1; Emotion: ceiling performance by all groups]. Within the Autism/AS group, there was no significant correlation between IQ and performance on the Eyes task (r = -.08). Finally, on Happe's Strange Stories, no subjects with Tourette Syndrome made any errors, but the subjects with autism or Asperger Syndrome made unfortunately their sources can no longer be traced. Liz Tennent kindly agreed to be photographed for stimuli shown in Fig. 2. 
